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ARGUMENT 
The issue raised by the present appeal is simple: Whether a ten-plex condominium 
building constitutes either a "detached single-family dwelling" or a "multifamily dwelling 
up to two units." The resolution of this issue is equally simple. A building containing ten 
attached condominium units is not a detached single-family dwelling. Attached is not 
detached. In addition, a building containing ten condominium units is not a multifamily 
dwelling up to two units. Ten is not two. 
The Appellee Unit Owners (the "Unit Owners") argue mightily that the relevant 
statute should be construed so that "attached" equals "detached" and "ten" equals "two." 
However, the plain language and intent of the Utah Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
Fund Act (the "Lien Restriction Act") preclude the Unit Owners' tortured interpretations. 
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE LIEN RESTRICTION ACT LIMITS 
ITS APPLICATIONS TO BUILDINGS CONTAINING NO MORE THAN 
TWO UNITS 
A. The Court Must Give Effect to the Plain Language of the Lien 
Restriction Statute 
The Supreme Court of Utah has emphasized the most important rule of statutory 
construction - giving effect to the plain language of the statute: 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of 
the legislature in light of the purpose the statue was meant to achieve. To 
discover that intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute. 
1 
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 34, 52 P.3d 1210 (quoting Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & 
Senior, 907 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added). "A statute's unambiguous 
language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at 
If 34. The Supreme Court of Utah has also emphasized the importance of ugiv[ing] each 
part of the provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its 
terms." Id. Interpretations which "would render portions of the statute redundant, 
superfluous, and inoperable [are] impermissible under the plain language rule." Id. at 
1f35. 
B. The Lien Restriction Act's Definition of "Residence" Is Unambiguous 
The Lien Restriction Act defines "residence" as follows: 
"Residence" means an improvement to real property used or occupied, to be 
used or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or secondary 
detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units, 
including factory built housing. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). The only portion of this definition at issue in the 
present appeal is the language "detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling 
up to two units." 
The Lien Restriction Act's definition of "residence" applies to improvements to 
real property which are used as (or in conjunction with) certain types of dwellings. Only 
two categories of dwellings fit within the definition: "detached single-family dwelling[s]" 
and "multifamily dwelling[s] up to two units." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). Thus, 
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for the Unit Owners to be eligible for the protections of the Lien Restriction Act, their 
units must fall into one of these categories. Judge Hilder's ruling fails to identify which 
of these categories applies to the Unit Owners' units. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on Home Owners' Motions for Summary Judgment [hereafter, "First Findings"], 
Addendum to Brief of Appellant ["First Brief Add."] 2-4; Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on Ann M. Farley's Motion for Summary Judgment [hereafter, 
"Second Findings"], First Brief Add. 10-12 .) The Unit Owners argue in their brief that 
"an individually owned condominium unit is a detached single-family dwelling." (Brief 
of Appellees at 12.) However, under the plain language of the Lien Restriction Act, the 
Unit Owners' units are neither "detached single-family dwellings" nor "multifamily 
dwellings up to two units.1 
*In a footnote, the Unit Owners suggest that other subcontractors in this case "are 
free to pursue their claims against the residence lien recovery fund" and that "CraCar 
would rather have its subcontractors paid by the innocent home owners, who have already 
paid once for their condominiums, than the residence lien recovery fund since CraCar 
would then be obligated to reimburse the fund under Utah Code Ann. § 3-11-207 . . . ." 
(Brief of Appellee at 8, n. 3.) The Unit Owners do not support their footnote with any 
citation to the record because the record does not support these allegations. Lien recovery 
fund representatives have indicated that any applications relating to buildings containing 
more than three units will be rejected because such buildings do not constitute 
"residences." (Tr. 693, 702.) In addition, because CraCar has not been paid by the 
developer, CraCar is entitled to recover from the lien recovery fund for work it performed 
on qualifying "residences" in the Bear Hollow Village Subdivision. 
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1. In The Lien Restriction Act, the Term "Dwelling" Refers to a 
Building 
The critical terms in the Lien Restriction Act's definition of "residence" are 
"dwelling," "detached," "single-family," and "multifamily . . . up to two units." An 
examination of the word "dwelling" provides assistance in understanding the other terms. 
The term "dwelling" refers to a "house or other structure in which a person or 
persons live " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 505 (6th Ed. 1990). The Unit Owners 
argue that a condominium unit in a ten-plex building is a "single-family dwelling." (Brief 
of Appellees at 12.) This interpretation is not feasible unless the term "dwelling" is 
synonymous with the term "unit." The legislature's use of both "dwelling" and "unit" in 
the same definition undercuts the Unit Owners' interpretation. Certainly the legislature 
would not have used two different terms to mean the same thing. 
The Lien Restriction Act does not expressly define the terms "dwelling." 
However, the language used by the legislature establishes that the term "dwelling" refers 
to a building and not a unit. The simple reference to a "multifamily dwelling up to two 
units," clarifies the legislature's intention that "dwelling" refer to a building and not a 
unit. It would be absurd and redundant to refer to a "multifamily unit up to two units." 
See State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a statue 
should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not 
intend an absurd result.") 
4 
The interpretation of a "dwelling" as a building where people live is consistent 
with the holdings of other jurisdictions which have construed this term. See, e.g., Davis 
v. Houston, 869 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (defining dwelling as "building 
used for human habitation" or "house or other structure in which a person or persons 
live"); Citizens Active in San Antonio v. Bd. of Equalization of San Antonio, 649 S.W.2d 
804, 806 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that dwelling "refers to a building used for human 
habitation, without regard to the number of units in a particular building" and "is broad 
enough to include multifamily dwellings and apartment houses"); Wallace v. St. Clair, 
127 S.E.2d 742, 754 (W. Va. 1962) (defining dwelling as "a building or construction used 
for residence"); Ervin v. Deloney Construction, Inc., 596 So.2d 593, 594 (Ala. 1992) 
("'dwelling' . . . is simply another word to mean a house in which a person or persons 
reside"); Manchester v. Phillips, 180 N.E.2d 333, 335 (Mass. 1962) (defining "detached 
one-family dwellings" as "structures of the type ordinarily thought of as houses"); Double 
D Manor v. Evergreen Meadows Homeowners' Assoc, 113 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Colo. 1989) 
(noting that "the phrase 'single-family dwelling' limits only the type of structure 
permitted on any site"). The only reasonable and sensible definition of the term 
"dwelling" in the Lien Restriction Act is a building or structure where people live which 
may contain more than one housing unit. 
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2. The Unit Owners' Units Do Not Constitute Detached Single-
Family Dwellings 
Because a "dwelling" under the Lien Restriction Act is a building containing one 
or more housing units, a "detached single-family dwelling" is a building which is 
detached from other buildings and provides housing for only one set of occupants. Once 
again, this construction is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Jones v. Smith, 241 F.Supp. 913, 915 (D. V.L [Virgin Islands] 1965) ("The term . . . 
'single family detached dwelling' refers to a dwelling wherein an individual or family 
lives, but which precludes more than one family from residing."); Weinstein v. Hunter, 96 
N.Y.S.2d 1, 8 (discussing reference to "detached single family dwelling" and holding that 
"the word 'detached' . . . limits construction to single family dwellings as distinguished 
from multiple or duplex type of dwellings."); Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 963 
(Wyo. 1996) ("The plain and ordinary meaning of 'single family residence' is a residence 
constructed for the purpose of serving as a dwelling place for one family in a single living 
unit; a residence constructed . . . for the purpose of serving as the dwelling place of. . . 
two separate living units is outside of this meaning."). 
In the present case, each Unit Owner owns one condominium unit in a building 
which contains ten separate housing units. (First Brief Add. 4, 16.) Accordingly, 
although the buildings at issue contain several attached single-family housing units, they 
are not "detached single-family" buildings. Attached is not detached. Thus, the Unit 
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Owners' units do not fall into the first category of dwellings which qualifies for 
protection under the Lien Restriction Act. 
3. The Unit Owners' Arguments Regarding "Character of 
Ownership"Are Unavailing 
The Unit Owners repeatedly refer to Judge Hilder's statement that the definition of 
"residence" somehow "focuses on the character of the ownership of the residence." (First 
Brief Add. at 4, 16; Brief of Appellees at 9, 10.) Judge Hilder used this statement to 
justify his conclusion that "so long as an owner of a residential unit in a condominium 
building does not own more than two units, that owner qualifies for the protection 
afforded by the statute." (First Brief Add. at 4, 16.) Apparently recognizing the lack of 
statutory and logical support for this conclusion, the Unit Owners have abandoned Judge 
Hilder's reasoning. Instead, the Unit Owners claim that the "character of ownership" 
relates to "how the property in question is actually used by its owner . . . ." (Brief of 
Appellees at 9.) The Unit Owners do not explain how "ownership" and "use" are 
connected. However, the Unit Owners suggest "the possibility that 'detached' could refer 
to ownership instead of physical relationship." (Brief of Appellees at 10.) There are 
several problems with this creative interpretation. 
In the statutory definition of "residence," the word "detached" is used to modify 
the term "single-family dwelling." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). There is nothing 
to suggest that "detached" modifies any other term in the definition. Because the words 
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"own," "owner," and "ownership" do not appear in the definition of "residence," it is 
inconceivable that "detached" would be referring to ownership. Finally, even if the term 
"ownership" did appear in the relevant provision, the Unit Owners have not explained 
exactly what "detached ownership" might mean. While housing units may be either 
attached or detached, it is difficult to imagine an ownership interest in real property which 
is not distinct and detached. The suggested concept of "detached ownership" is not 
supported by the statutory language or by common sense and is contrary to the plain 
meaning of the Lien Restriction Act. 
4. The Unit Owners9 Units Do Not Constitute "Multifamily Dwellings 
Up to Two Units" 
The buildings inhabited by the Unit Owners are clearly "multifamily dwellings" 
because they each house ten single-family housing units. However, under the Lien 
Restriction Act, only those multifamily dwellings containing "up to two units" are 
considered "residences." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). The term "up to two units" 
is not ambiguous. In includes buildings with one or two units but not buildings with tliree 
or more units. Ten is not two. Accordingly, the ten-unit buildings at issue in the present 
case are not the type of multifamily dwellings protected by the Lien Restriction Act. 
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C. The Unit Owners' Interpretation of "Residence" Is Contrary to 
Recognized Rules of Statutory Construction 
1. The Construction Proposed by the Unit Owners Would Create 
Absurd Results 
The definition of "residence" proposed by the Unit Owners would create absurd 
results. Almost no property would be excluded from the definition of "residence." By 
restricting the term "residence" to multifamily dwellings containing "up to two units," the 
legislature clearly limited the types of buildings whose owners would be protected by the 
Lien Restriction Act. The definition of "residence" proffered by the Unit Owners would 
remove that limitation and extend the Lien Restriction Act's protection to the owners of 
condominium or apartment buildings containing any number of units. Owners of units in 
a 200-unit high-rise condominium building would be protected under the Unit Owners5 
tortured construction of the Lien Restriction Act. In addition, the owner of a 12-unit 
apartment building would also qualify for the protections of the Lien Restriction Act 
since an "owner-occupied residence" includes residences occupied by the owner's 
tenants. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(16). Clearly, the legislature did not intend the 
protections of the Lien Restriction act to apply to such a broad category of multifamily 
buildings. Because ten does not equal two, the Unit Owners are not protected by the Lien 
Restriction Act. 
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2. The Unit Owners' Interpretation Would Render Portions of the 
Lien Restriction Act Superfluous 
The Unit Owners' peculiar construction would render significant portions of the 
statutory definition superfluous. Had the legislature intended housing units in any 
building, no matter what size, to be protected by the Lien Restriction Act, it could have 
omitted the references to "single-family" and "multifamily dwellings" and simply 
designated "a primary or secondary housing unit, including factory built housing." Cf 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20) ("a primary or secondary detached single-family 
dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units, including factory built housing.") The 
Unit Owners' construction would render the terms "single-family" and "multifamily 
dwellings" superfluous. Because a statute must be construed to "give effect to all of its 
terms," Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at f 34, the Unit Owners' construction must be rejected. 
Ironically, the Unit Owners argue that CraCar's plain and reasonable construction 
of the language in the Lien Restriction Act "would require the court to render 
meaningless parts of the definitions of'residence' and 'owner-occupied residence' that 
reference the use of the property in question . . . . " (Brief of Appellees at 9.) However, 
the Unit Owners are unable to point to any statutory language which would be "rendered 
meaningless" by this common-sense construction. The definition's only reference to the 
"use of the property in question" is the language "to be used . . . as . . . a primary or 
secondary . . . dwelling " UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). This language was 
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intended to limit the Lien Restriction Act's protection to properties where people live. 
The construction proposed by CraCar would not have any detrimental impact on this 
language. To the contrary, to qualify for the protections of the Lien Restriction Act, a 
property would still need to be a primary or secondary place where people live. Offices, 
warehouses, factories and commercial buildings would continue to be excluded from the 
definition of "residence." CraCar's plain and reasonable interpretation of the term 
"residence" would not render meaningless any parts of the Lien Restriction Act. 
II. UTAH'S CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP ACT DOES NOT ALTER THE 
LIEN RESTRICTION ACT'S DEFINITION OF "RESIDENCE" 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-4 Does Not Transform Attached 
Condominium Units into Detached Single-Family Dwellings 
The Unit Owners incorrectly argue that the provisions of the Condominium 
Ownership Act require that condominium buildings be treated differently from other 
buildings when it comes to the protections of the Lien Restriction Fund. The Unit 
Owners cite UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-4 (a provision not relied upon by the trial court in 
its conclusions of law) for the proposition that a condominium unit is "a separate parcel 
of real property (or 'detached' under the terminology of the Lien Restriction Act) . . . ." 
(Brief of Appellees at 11.) Section 57-8-4 provides as follows: 
Each unit, together with its undivided interest in the common areas and 
facilities, [1] shall, for all purposes, constitute real property and [2] may be 
individually conveyed, leased and encumbered and [3] may be inherited or 
devised by will and be subject to all types of juridic acts inter vivos or 
mortis causa as if it were sole and entirely independent of all other units, 
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and [4] the separate units shall have the same incidents as real property, and 
[5] the corresponding individual titles and interests therein shall be 
recordable. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-4 (bracketed numbers added). This provision can be broken 
down into five distinct parts, each of which is separated by the conjunction "and": 
1. Each unit constitutes real property for all purposes; 
2. Each unit may be individually conveyed, leased, and encumbered; 
3. Each unit may be inherited, devised, and subject to judicial acts as if it were 
sole and entirely independent of all other units; 
4. Separate units have the same incidents as real property; and 
5. Individual titles and interests to condominium units are recordable. 
Through its underlined emphasis, the Unit Owners seek to intermix these five parts by 
suggesting that each unit should be considered "for all purposes . . . as if it were sole and 
entirely independent of all other units . . . . " (Brief of Appellees at 11.) It is important to 
note that the language "for all purposes" modifies only the words "constitute real 
property . . . ." In addition, the language "as if it were sole and entirely independent of all 
other units" relates only to "and may be inherited or devised by will and be subject to all 
types of juridic acts inter vivos or mortis causa . . . . " The statute does not indicate that a 
condominium unit is sole and entirely independent of all other units or that the unit should 
be considered that way for all purposes. And most importantly, the Condominium 
Ownership Act does not state or suggest that a condominium unit housed in a building 
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with several other condominium units is or should be treated as a "detached" single-
family building or a multifamily building containing no more than two units. 
B. Although Condominium Units Are Treated as Separate Parcels of Real 
Property, They Do Not Constitute Detached Single-Family Dwellings 
The Unit Owners also fail to bridge the gap between a condominium unit in a 
ten-unit building being treated as "a separate parcel of real property" and being deemed a 
"detached single-family dwelling" under the Lien Restriction Act. As CraCar indicated 
previously, the legislature's use of the word "dwelling" clearly denotes an entire building 
or structure which may contain more than one housing unit. A detached single-family 
dwelling must necessarily be a building which stands alone and is designed to house only 
one "family" or cohabiting group. 
In a case involving the interpretation of a zoning statute, the District Court of 
Appeals of Florida reversed the trial court's ruling that condominium units in buildings 
containing more than three units constitute "single family dwellings": 
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in holding that each condominium 
unit in Land's End is a single family dwelling. We agree. The plain 
definitions in the code provide that a multiple family dwelling is a building 
containing three or more dwelling units. There is no question that the 
buildings which make up Land's End contain more than three dwelling 
units. . . . The trial court erred in holding that the condominium units 
were separate single family dwellings. This holding does not comport with 
the plain and obvious meaning of the definitions in the Code. 
Belair v. City of Treasure Island, 611 So.2d 1285, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) 
(emphasis added). Like the units at issue in Belair, the units owned by the Unit Owners 
13 
are not single family dwellings, and they certainly are not "detached." Accordingly, the 
units in question do not constitute "residences" under the Lien Restriction Act. 
The Unit Owners argue that "condominium ownership is more 'detached' than 
traditional lots [because] [condominium owners' exclusively owned property boundaries 
. . . do n o t . . . touch each other." (Brief of Appellees at 10, n. 4.) However, the Unit 
Owners are considering the wrong type of detachment. It is the dwelling (i.e., building) 
which must be detached, not the boundaries of the real property upon which the dwelling 
sits. The boundary lines of the real property are irrelevant. For example, a single family 
or multifamily dwelling could straddle two or more parcels of real property. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 38-1-4 (contemplating mechanic's lien against buildings which "shall 
occupy two or more lots or other subdivisions of land"). Conversely, one parcel of real 
property could contain more than one single family or multifamily dwelling. But these 
variations do not change the Lien Restriction Act's requirement that the building contain 
no more than two housing units. The provisions of the Condominium Ownership Act do 
not change this outcome. 
C. CraCar's Interpretation of "Residence" Ensures That Liens Against 
Condominium Units Are Created "In the Same Manner and Under the 
Same Conditions" as Liens Against Other Separate Real Property 
The Condominium Ownership Act provides that "liens . . . shall arise or be created 
. . . against each un i t . . . in the same manner and under the same conditions in every 
respect as liens or encumbrances may . . . be created upon or against any other separate 
14 
parcel of real property subject to individual ownership." UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-19(1). 
Without providing an explanation, the Unit Owners argue that CraCar's interpretation of 
"residence" would "create a separate body of mechanic's lien law relative to 
condominiums in direct contravention of this language of sameness." (Brief of Appellees 
at 12.) To the contrary, CraCar's interpretation of the Lien Restriction Act allows liens to 
be created against condominium units in the same manner that liens are created against 
other separate real property. 
A mechanic's lien is created when a claimant properly records a notice of lien 
against a parcel of real property which has been improved by the claimant's labor, 
materials, or equipment. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7. If improvements are made to a 
condominium unit, the notice of lien is recorded against that particular unit rather than the 
entire building or the land upon which the building sits. If the owner of the parcel in 
question can establish defenses under the Lien Restriction Act, the claimant is required to 
remove the mechanic's lien. In determining whether the property is a residence under the 
Lien Restriction Act, the court must determine whether the improvements are to be used 
in conjunction with a detached single-family dwelling or a multifamily dwelling up to two 
units. Units in buildings containing more than two housing units will not be considered 
"residences." 
While the Act's definition of "residence" excludes many condominium buildings, 
it also excludes many non-condominium buildings. For example, apartment buildings 
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with three or more units are excluded from the definition of "residence." The owner of a 
town house which is connected by a common wall to two or more other town houses does 
not qualify for the protections of the Lien Restriction Act. Similarly, if three individually 
owned housing units are connected by party walls, each of those units falls outside the 
Lien Restriction Act's protections. Regardless of whether the entire building is owned by 
one person (like an apartment) or separate housing units in the building are individually 
owned (like town houses, units connected by party walls, or condominiums), the critical 
factor is the number of housing units contained within the building. 
The Unit Owners argue that condominium units should be treated differently from 
other connected, individually owned housing units (like town houses and units connected 
by party walls). Under their proposal, a condominium unit in a three-unit building would 
be considered a residence, while three attached town houses or three units connected by 
party walls would not. Clearly, the Unit Owners5 construction runs contrary to the 
Condominium Ownership Act's mandate that liens be created against condominium units 
"in the same manner and under the same conditions in every respect as liens . . . may . . . 
be created against any other separate parcel of real property subject to individual 
ownership." UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-19(1). Unlike the Unit Owners' construction, the 
plain-language definition proposed by CraCar satisfies this requirement. 
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LIEN RESTRICTION ACT IS NOT 
BEFORE THIS COURT 
The Unit Owners argue on one hand that CraCar's interpretation of the Lien 
Restriction Fund is unconstitutional while admitting on the other hand that they did not 
properly raise this constitutional argument before the trial court. (Brief of Appellees at 
13.) A constitutionality argument not properly raised before the trial court and upon 
which the trial court did not rule cannot impact this court's interpretation of the Lien 
Restriction Act. 
The Unit Owners cite Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 
1989) in support of their argument. Payne properly outlines the constitutional avoidance 
rule of construction that "[i]f there are alternative statutory constructions possible, one 
rendering a statute constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the former should be 
adopted." Id. at 467. However, there are two reasons why the ruling in Payne does not 
apply to the present case. First, under the other rules of statutory construction discussed 
above, there is no plausible construction of the term "residence" which would support the 
Unit Owners5 position. Second, neither Payne nor the case it cites in support, Critchlow 
v. Monson, 131 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942), suggests that an unbriefed constitutional argument 
raised without prior notice to the parties or the state attorney general requires the court to 
construe a statute contrary to its plain meaning. In Payne, the party asserting the 
unconstitutionality of the statute properly raised and briefed that argument. Payne, 782 
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P.2d at 465 ("Appellant. . . argues that construing section 7-15-1 to impose strict liability 
renders the statute unconstitutional....") The court noted that "[although we do not 
treat appellant's due process claims, we note they raise sufficient doubt about the 
constitutionality of the construction of the statute urged by plaintiff to create a policy 
preference for the narrower construction we have adopted." Id. Thus, the Payne court 
did not actually apply the constitutional avoidance rule of construction because that 
would have required a determination that the proffered interpretation was constitutionally 
infirm. Instead, the court in Payne mentioned that the rule of construction, along with the 
party's arguments, created a "policy preference" which constituted one of several reasons 
the court chose to reject a certain construction of the statute. In Critchlow, the 
constitutionality argument was raised and briefed, and the court addressed and rejected 
that argument. Critchlow, 131 P.2d at 394-95. 
The Unit Owners in the present case have failed to cite any Utah cases which 
directly apply the constitutional avoidance rule of construction without first formally 
determining whether any constitutionality infirmity actually exists. Because the 
constitutionality issue was not properly raised before or determined by the trial court, the 
Unit Owners' arguments regarding the constitutional avoidance rule of construction are 
unavailing. 
The Unit Owners suggest that the Court may affirm on constitutional grounds even 
though the constitutional issue was not briefed below and the attorney general was never 
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Unit Owners' arguments regarding the constitutional avoidance rule of construction are 
unavailing. 
The Unit Owners suggest that the Court may affirm on constitutional grounds even 
though the constitutional issue was not briefed below and the attorney general was never 
given an opportunity to be heard. However, such an approach would eviscerate UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-33-11. If the appellate courts could bypass the requirement that the 
attorney general be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on constitutional issues, 
that statutory provision would be rendered meaningless and important procedural 
safeguards would be subverted. Clearly, the doctrine of affirming on legal theories not 
raised at trial cannot overpower an explicit statutory requirement prescribing the 
procedure to be followed when constitutional issues are raised. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, CraCar requests that this Court do the following: 
(1) overturn the trial court's Conclusions of Law stating that the units owned by the Unit 
Owners are "residences" under the Lien Restriction Act; (2) reverse the Order and 
Judgment entered by the trial court requiring that mechanic's lien claimants remove their 
mechanic's liens from the Unit Owners' units; and (3) declare that an owner of a unit in a 
condominium building housing three or more units is not an owner of a "residence" as 
that term is defined in the Lien Restriction Act. 
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